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Introduction
The commissioning by International Studies of Stephen M Walt s essay The Renaissance of Security 
Studies opens a much needed debate about what scholars and pracutioners mean by security and what precisely 
they think they are studying and why 1 This critique responds to the essay s welcome call for cooperative 
collaboration and diversity to widen and deepen the discussion
The article while helpful errs on several critical counts Analytically it limits the objects of study and 
ipso facto constricts the scope of relevant theory needed to understand and explain what security is and what 
security problems are Normatively it focuses almost exclusively on American national security rather than on 
international security or security per se and m the name of relevance delegates too much of the agenda of 
security studies to policymakers Methodologically it restricts security studies to a highly selective and largely 
traditional array of disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches As a consequence of these flaws the essay is 
inevitably incomplete in its survey of security studies in its assignation of worth and pnonty to different 
theoretical approaches and specific works and in its sketch of a research agenda.
The essay s avowedly neo realist position if permitted by default to guide the field puts at risk several 
important aims shared by many accomplished scholars and scientists concerned with security studies the field s 
potential within the academy the interdisciplinary examination of security problems hitherto shunned or 
slighted by Cold War concerns the flow of ideas from the academy to policymakers a development celebrated 
by the essay as a renaissance in security studies the search for better ways and for more varied disciplinary 
approaches to teach security studies where immense progress has been made thanks to foundation and 
governmental support and the legitimate pursuit of significant lmes of research and innovative methods that 
promise to make important contributions to security theory and to the resolution of armed conflict, which may 
not be compatible with realist strictures
This critique aims less at detailing the essay s failings than at widemng the debate about how security 
analysts can develop a richer conceptual a broader interdisciplinary a theoretically more inclusive and not 
ironically a more policy relevant understanding of security studies than what the survey presents Citations are 
illustrative not exhaustive since my reservations about the survey are conceptual and valuational not 
bibliographic
Flaws in Definition Implications for Social Science Theory
The essay defines security studies as the study o f the threat use and control o f military force 2 T o b e  
included as central in the definition of security studies a work must essentially fit comfortably within the 
familiar realist paradigm and address phenomena that can be controlled by national leaders These 
conditions—theoretical significance as realism and national relevance as defined by factors under the purported 
control of policymakers—are key parameters of the essay s notion of the scope of security studies and what are 
or what should be viewed as contributions to the literature Alternative definitions of security are not noted, 
much less explored, nor is a case made for so narrow a conception of the field. The problem of what are security 
studies is simply defined away by identifying it essentially with the study of war and diplomacy between states
This definitional issue is not trivial How analysts and practitioners define security problems determines 
what they think is important Definitions elicit questions that must be answered if empirical and normative 
theory and problem solving are to the advanced The questions asked as any scientist or normative theorist
1 Stephen M Walt, The Renaissance of Security Studies International Studies Quarterly 35 (1991) 211 239
2 Emphasis in the original p 212
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knows are more important than provisional answers The task then is to ask the right questions or—if one is 
charged with surveying a field—to ask at least how published scholars and statesmen have posed the problem 
of security rather than preemptively advance a particular answer to a question never fully posed much less 
satisfactorily explored
If the essay s circumscribed idea of security studies were logically and systematically applied important 
security problems even on neo-realist exclusionary grounds could not be reached and, if addressed, then only 
indirectly and obliquely as tributaries of interstate conflict and war If the essay rules m first image threats to 
the state by omission it rules out as primary concerns security threats posed by states to groups and individuals 
The rationale manipulative techniques and coercive measures and institutionalized forms of repression of 
authoritarian regimes are proper and primary objects of study for security analysts and practitioners Death 
squads in Central and Latin America the totalitarian regimes of Nazi Germany Stalinist Russia and Pol Pot s 
Cambodia as well as the causes of the Holocaust, the Gulag and killing fields are security issues of the first 
magnitude They need study by security scholars and policymakers whether they fall within the essay s 
conceptual honzon or not
Also worthy of study are the armed pursuits strategies and claims of non state actors like Palestinians 
Kurds Croates Serbs or the African National Congress Guerrilla warfare terrorism and low intensity 
warfare as the arm of the weak and disenfranchised are no less central to security studies These forms of armed 
conflict (about which incidentally much has been written although not reviewed in the survey) are likely to 
become increasingly more important as ethnic and nationality wars within nation states and so-called 
internationalized civil wars like Lebanon that spill over national boundaries become more frequent Certainly 
the state is threatened by these movements (and they ment study from a state centnc perspective) but the 
emergence of these social movements also suggests that the state is often a major source of international 
msec un ty—the problem not the solution to international secunty
In this vein given the entena directing the essay s conception of secunty studies the threats posed by 
military and police bureaucracies military industrial complexes and standing armies to open societies can be 
addressed only when these problems are somehow causally linked to interstate wars Disciplining organized and 
institutionalized violence to civil purposes is tolerated in the survey as a subfield of study but only as a 
function of violent national conflicts and not as an independent secunty issue in its own nght The normative 
and empirical theorizing of the Federalist wnters to create a popular government strong enough to resist foreign 
aggression but limited in its political and military power to tyrannize its own people is logically arguably 
fatally excluded from the essay s portrayal of secunty studies
Second unage analysis of secunty problems fares no better Coups d’etat and civil wars as the struggle 
between groups for the control of the state s monopoly of legitimate violence are slighted as key secunty 
issues These armed conflicts—arising as often as not from clashing atavistic urges and prompted by profund 
ideological communal national ethnic racial class and elite differences—are indiscriminately stuffed into a 
nation state sack Hiding this seeming clutter of qualitative distinctions for the sake of a forced simplicity 
merely begs the secunty questions that need answering and relevant theory to confront them
In light of the values at stake and the global repercussions of the Bntish French Amencan Russian and 
Chinese civil wars it may well be argued that these purported internal wars and not the interstate wars they 
spawned ought really to be the pnmary focus of secunty studies Civil stnfe and conflict arguably raise more 
fundamental secunty problems about the legitimacy of coercion and the role of the state m regulating civil 
conflict than a state-centnc focus As the society of states moves gradually toward a world society of peoples 
the issue of the legitimacy of a particular regime s rule will become increasingly difficult to ignore as a critical 
secunty issue (Kothan 1974 Bull 1977) The Amencan and French revolutions and now the defunct Soviet 
expenment urge this question upon the consciousness of peoples and elites everywhere From an even wider 
analytic perspective it may well be argued that, as a global society of peoples and states grope towards a 
provisional world order what histonans have up to now charactenzed as interstate wars may well be viewed as a 
long chain of civil stnfes
Why else are we concerned as a secunty issue whether the ongoing Chinese and Russian revolutions will 
evolve toward open democratic forms and a market economy or whether they will revert to past forms of
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oppressive rule if we are not ultimately concerned that the fate of these titanic struggles hold potentially 
catastrophic implications for our personal and national security interests not to mention those of the world 
society and its diverse and divergent populations These concerns similarly underlie the West s and the world s 
uneasiness about the continued persistence of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq The security issues raised by 
armed civil strife and by the violent efforts of groups to seize the monopoly power of the state to impose their 
will are only partially raised by the conflicts inherent in the nation state system as one element of the 
provisional solution to the global security dilemma and then only in a fashion as Martin Wight suggests 
that prejudices the analysis in favor of the nation state at the expense of a theory of international relations 
(Wight 1966)
The essay s strict constructionist interpretation of the scope of security studies narrows access of scholars 
and practitioners to needed theory to explain what they are studying and why Giants of realist thought, like 
Hobbes rooted the problem of security m the insatiable and incompatible demands of individuals and groups— 
what politics is after all—who were prepared to use force or threats to get their way (the security dilemma) Not 
without significance Hobbes universal characterization of the security problem arose from the upheaval of the 
English civil war and not from its later manifestation in the nation state system only just beginning to emerge 
with the treaty of Westphalia m 1648
In truncating Hobbes grasp of the security dilemma and the problem of political legitimacy the essay 
overlooks not surprisingly some of today s outstanding theorists like Robert Axelrod and the new methods 
they employ in their insistence on posing the problem of security m the most theoretically inclusive terms 
Sapped too is the timeless force of Axelrod s compelling question Under what conditions will cooperation 
emerge in a world of egoists without central authority7 (Axelrod 1984 3) The essay would reduce the search 
for a solution to the security equation by searching for an unknown value of only one its elements viz war 
between states Never asked are the fundamental questions of from whence and whither states not only as 
provisional solutions to the global security dilemma but also as security problems themselves
Senous conceptual gaps even appear on the level of the essay s preference for third image analysis The 
assumption is made that most theories about the causes of war are also causes of peace (p 224) 
Illustrations from the expenence of the Cold War and European integration raise doubts about this assumption 
and its self fulfilling policy implications Using the modest tools and lean data, relied upon in the survey the 
security analyst would presumably be forced to conclude that superior military force a favorable balance of 
power and more adept diplomacy explain why the West won the Cold War George Kennan s prescient 
argument that the Soviet regime would eventually be forced to mellow if the West relied primarily on its 
internal strength founded on political freedom and economic productivity to contain Soviet expansionism 
rather than on threats and military power fall outside the essay s theoretical consideration (Kennan 1947)
Thus the explanation of one of the great epic struggles of recorded history is implicitly resolved by the pre 
programmed application of realist formulae On the other hand if Kennan s argument is admitted then an 
explanation for the sources consequences and resolution of the Cold War is left to non security theorists by 
default
The statesmen who fashioned the Marshall Plan for Europe and imposed a generous peace on a vanquished 
Germany and Japan were also acutely aware that an international system relymg solely on threats and coercion 
would repeat the dismal cycle of defiance counter armament and war unless counterbalancing forces to the 
nation state struggle could be set in motion (The theoretical basis for this argument is outlined m Bouldmg 
1963 for deterrence theory see Morgan 1983) Many of the architects of the postwar system trusted to the 
positive incentives of economic growth and to the psychological and political assurances of open institutions to 
promote peace and security (Baldwin 1985) Security analysts if limited to the guidelines and assumpbons of 
the survey would then be able to make little sense of Marshall s argument that it is logical that the United 
States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health m the world without 
which there can be no political stability and no assured peace” (Dennett and Turner 1949) They are placed in 
the awkward posibon of dismissing what Marshall has to say as either self deceiving or disingenuous—he could 
not have meant what he said and was really animated solely by macht considerabons to fight the Cold War—or 
they must assume the uncomfortable posibon if they concede his point but still wish to remain bue to their 
realist loyalhes that his argument might have the force of a theory of peace but not of security
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Functionalist (Mitrany 1966) integrations (Haas 1968) and Gaullist theorizing aimed at resolving 
Europe s national enmities as well as the resourceful efforts of a half century of European statecraft devoted to 
surmounting them no less fall outside the essay s theoretical sites These efforts to supplant Europe s rivalries 
through cooperative ventures—common markets multilateral security organizations and a shared commitment 
to democratic institutions—are excluded or marginalized as security phenomena i e from the essay s insular 
notion of what security analysts should study
It is just not enough as the essay commendably allows tobe committed to democratic discourse and to 
test the proposition whether democracies are peaceful Security analysis also extends to the search for testable 
theory about the conditions for creating preserving and promoting democracy as a necessary if not sufficient 
condition for global peace Thus for example not only should Samuel P Huntington s contributions to 
security theory which address civil military relations and the American domestic political process be cited—as 
they are—but also his insightful work m first and second image analysis that explores the determinants of 
political development and the implications of regime values for creating stable and legitimate national and 
international orders (Huntington 1968 1981)
For the security scholar the theoretical issue centers on answering the question of what how and why 
individuals groups and communities get what they want through force threats or other coercive means This 
specialized concern limited m scope to foster theory and empirical testing is an abstraction from the full range 
of subjective motivations and external factors driving behavior and from their complex interdependencies The 
task of theory is not only to disaggregate the phenomenon of violence and politics into components but also to 
integrate them to ensure that specialized considerations and findings of the security analyst and practitioner are 
not portrayed as the whole of the phenomena being explained human behavior To accomplish this critical 
integrative function the security specialist needs help from other scientists and humanists
To insulate security analysis from other disciplines and their assumptions and testable findings about non 
violent human behavior is alun to asking the physicist to confine himself to classical mechanics when he 
knows quantum mechanics is more suitable Similarly if the security analyst must begin with perceived threats 
of coercion it does not follow that threats can be distinguished finally from the values that are at nsk—what 
men value and care about If m the final analysis threats are the obverse of values and interests (one has to care 
before one is threatened) then threats can be understood as Bouldmg and others persuasively argue m ways 
other than counter threats and violence as the guarantee of their realization and security (Bouldmg 1989)
Positive sanctions may work to overcome threat perceptions and relax tensions (Baldwin 1979) or rewards and 
inducements may be alternative ways to foster cooperation or diminish conflict in getting one s way (Milbum 
andChnstie 1989)
From this witter perspective it would appear problematic in the extreme to equate Grand Strategy to the 
study of military and diplomatic means (p 218) What statesmen today would nsk office and the discharge of 
security responsibilities by confining attention and political resources purely to macht politics7 Lagging 
economic and techno scientific development and domestic political oppression as some Soviet and Chinese 
leaders have yet to learn are prescnptions for weakness at home and impotence abroad Other things also matter 
if national and international security is to be assured, including economic growth and welfare international 
competition and scientific development What many cherish most—scientific knowledge—is also the source of 
our discontents since it is the indispensable condition for the creation of new and more powerful hostile 
technologies that pose entirely new unprecedented problems that must be resolved if security planners and 
citizens are to cope with the potentially self destructive violence at their disposal These so-called elements of 
low politics simply cannot any longer be subordinated to high politics (theorizing about the nation state and 
war) without damage to theory building and problem solving (Baldwin 1979 Bouldmg 1989) The former 
have an integrity and force as independent variables that are shaping the world society as quite separate from 
interstate conflict Indeed, social science is obliged not only to help the soldier and diplomat but to explain their 
behavior too Delegating or denigrating this latter responsibility as the analysis below suggests risks the 
scientific pursuit of security studies itself
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Raws m Definition Implications for Normative Theory
The shaky analytic pillars on which the essay supports the security studies edifice also reveal a shallow 
normative foundation on which these pillars rest The problems posed by the use threat and control of 
organized violence risks being severed from its moral and legal determinants Except on instrumental grounds— 
i e deciding whether force will work—the issue of the utility of force is isolated from the central question of its 
legitimate use threat or control The essay s philosophically restrictive notion of the social sciences would 
confine the security scholar to testing proposmons largely specified by the state powerbrokers policymakers 
and managers of violence The latter decide what is real relevant and controllable the security scholar using 
scientific methods and rigorous empirical procedures is then relegated to the subservient task of assessing the 
feasibility of policy proposals generated elsewhere He serves best who evaluates which parcels and passels of 
organized violence proposed for use by the state and its agents will achieve their stated aims Social science is 
transformed into the handmaiden of Grand Strategy What works pragmatically for using and controlling force— 
selected scientific tools and an insistence on verifiability—is enlisted m the strategic enterprise but not so the 
uncompromising protocols and unfettered sweep of true scientific inquiry
The contesting claims of rival normative theories of human behavior are no less dismissed in the 
proclamation of a dubious realism congenial to the rationalization of violence and coercive threats Once 
strapped into the normative straightjacket undergirding the essay the security analyst is exempt from the 
personal and professional responsibility of questioning the limits of his theory except to perfect his expectations 
of state behavior based on realist norms If he or she examines what the essay characterizes as peace theory it is 
to be from the directed perspective of realist theory and practice Realist security analysts are advised that 
[g]iven their belief that war is always a possibility realists should be especially interested in devising ways to 
ensure that it does not occur In short well informed research on peace is a realistic response to anarchy and 
should be part of security studies (p 225) The assumptions and findings of social and life scientists regarding 
the conditions and factors prompting human cooperation and conflict can be absorbed into the thinking of the 
security analyst but only after the purported impurities of these alternative behavioral paradigms have been 
filtered out to ensure that realist theory will not be contaminated
By using so fine a filter to distill pure security studies the survey quite logically if misguidedly identifies 
the golden age and renaissance of security studies with two different phases of the Cold War Many of the works 
cited as seminal are efforts at rationalizing not always successfully as the Vietnam War suggests American use 
of force and threats to win the US Soviet struggle Ruled out of order are the critics of the Cold War who 
charged that the US Soviet struggle and the bipolanty that it induced was unstable in its tendency to incite and 
fuel regional conflicts (leading potentially to a global conflagration) and fundamentally illegitimate in 
arrogating national and global security to the superpowers (De Gaulle 1970 voi 5 104 105 Nehru 1961)
Time serving is to be conditioned as the essay admonishes by the norms of collaborative diverse and 
democratic discourse (p 231) These are certainly estimable norms but they are not enough to extricate us 
from the moral quandary that the essay s circumscribed conception of security studies leads us In providing a 
particular philosophical answer to a question yet to be definitively decided, with respect to the moral basis for 
the use or threat of force the essay unwittingly frustrates the normative quest to address fully the profound 
moral dimensions of this problem prematurely calls closure to the debate over the legitimacy of relying on 
violence or alternative means to ameliorate or to avoid conflicts and narrows the exploration of the object to be 
studied as well as the range of scientific methods and philosophical approaches that might help to relax if not 
resolve the dilemmas that anse when politics and violence are joined.
In raising these objections let us also be clear about what is not at issue Certainly most of the works 
cited ment senous attention Nor are the scientific method and its application to secunty problems on tnal 
More not less ngor is advised Nor is realist moral philosophy on tnal It stands m pnnciple as an equal to 
other moral positions before the bar of scientific inquiry and human expenence It should also be clear that the 
author is not accused of any personal moral failing The thrust of the argument here rather is to insist that 
empincal and normative inquiry on secunty problems be kept open and not directed unwittingly toward what 
appears to be a moral cul de sac If the true Renaissance was anything it was a moral revolution that began to
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free the human mind to explore without limit the possibilities of transcending the political constraints force 
and chance of the social and political institutions to which men are bom If Machiavelli wrote the Prince the 
quintessential realist handbook of rule by the few he also explored how the consensual base of governance 
might be broadened in the Discourses
For the sake of brevity and clanty let s deploy Quincy Wright s Study o f War —surely among the first 
systematic and rigorous social science efforts to understand and explain war—to make the argument we would 
like to advance if we had enough time and space Even a casual reading of this magisterial work dispatched in a 
footnote (p 213) suggests thafrt is a better guide forscientifie discovery interdisciplinary study and moral 
guidance than the essay s partial view of security studies
Wnght defines war as the legal condition which equally permits two oc more hostile groups to carry on a 
conflict by armed force This suggests that in spite of their hostility they are members of a higher group 
which originates this law (Wnght 1942 8 9 italics ongrnal) Note the breadth of Wnght s understanding of
war which includes not only a focus on interstate war but much more For Wnght war is observable 
empincally following regular patterns that could be submitted to scientific inquiry and to normative exegesis 
The potentially legitimate agents of armed force may be any group not just the state Moreover first second 
and third image levels of analysis are comfortably mcluded as parts of the puzzle that the secunty analyst and 
practitioner must solve Strategic thinking is squarely centered in the humanistic and social sciences and not 
consigned to the halls of governments If all groups provisionally stand on a level legal and moral playing field 
until their nval claims can be examined and evaluated as members of a higher group which originates this law 
then a moral and legal framework is at least coterminous arguably precedential to the solutions that 
communities render m their search for a viable secunty order Wnght expects students and practitioners of war 
to explicate higher laws—behavioral and normative—that can potentially discriminate between the nval claims 
of contesting groups and the efficacy of their rebanee on violence and coercion Wnght opens the sack marked 
war and in sorung out its components discovers for our edification (although wntten a half century ago) that an 
explanation of war requires a bigger sack to hold its contents than the survey will allow
What is compelling about Wnght s approach to war is that it includes not excludes all forms of human 
behavior associated with violence in the study of war and, by extension of secunty that it is both scientific and 
normative in its claims and that it provides the widest possible berth for human and behavioral disciplines and 
the hard sciences to participate in understanding and explaining war Inquiry is enlarged not diminished, the 
search for relevant normative and empincal theones of war and peace is widened not narrowed to the nation 
state a singular focus that can only act as Martin Wight argues as a prophylaxis to theory (Wight 1966) a 
broader range of disciplines and knowledge is mvoked to solve secunty problems and the debate is extended not 
constrained or closed. Yet secunty studies need not be expanded as Professor Walt prudently counsels to 
pollution disease child abuse or economic recessions” (p 213) Wnght no less than Walt, addresses violence 
force and coercion m shaping human behavior but his search for their causes consequences and control is 
conducted on a vaster scale appropnate to the vision and responsibilities of the academy and with greater 
sensitivity and responsiveness to the breadth and depth of the policy problems that have to be addressed
Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Scope of Secunty Studies
As the preceding discussion and citations suggest the essay s partial grasp of the analytic normative and 
methodological dimensions of secunty studies occasions senous oversights in the survey of the relevant 
disciplines and works that have advanced the field Ethical moral and legal discourse is barred entry at the 
frontier of secunty studies (e g Walzer 1977) The contnbutions of psychology are slighted (e g Osgood 
1963) as are the important research findings funnelled through the Journal o f Conflict Resolution (e g Pious 
1987) or the Journal o f Social Issues (e g Levinger 1987)
Economics which is especially important today in explaining the post Cold War world environment is 
relegated to a secondary role although its disciplinary concerns are increasingly central to national and 
international secunty (Intnlligator 1990 Reppy 1989) Cunously there is no reference to Defence 
Economics the key journal in the field The essay s sparse citations of work on the literature of arms 
production and transfers as modest concessions to the economic dimensions of secunty suggest that the survey
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of the economic literature does not comfortably fit with the essay s bounded definition of security The implicit 
mercantilist assumptions underlying the survey inhibit the exploration of alternative explanations like those 
offered by Uberai and Marxist theorists of armed conflict and war (Gilpin 1987)
Similarly anthropologists and sociologists are expected to take a back seat m the security bus Moms 
Janowitz The Professional Soldier translated into several languages and widely read by military professionals 
around the globe is not cited nor is the principal journal Armed Services and Society which Janowitz founded 
while a distinguished professor at the University of Chicago even noted (He is cited as a contributor to the 
golden age but the uninformed reader is left to guess why ) Game theory loses out, too because it appears to 
Walt to be of limited relevance although that judgment hardly squares with the international interest, in 
academic and policy circles m the works of Robert Axelrod (1984) or Steven Brams (1985)
Senous historical and social science works that view security studies in units of centuries and millennia 
not just decades are dismissed as of limited relevance or ignored although some have won international 
recognition for originality as advances m scientific rigor (Singer 1972) and scholarship (Schroeder 1989) 
History and the challenge to interpret the meaning of this record of human creation within the evolutionary 
process is decomposed into a search for confirming data to support policy proposals or realist assumptions 
The historian becomes a hewer of wood and a drawer of water for the security theorist.
As Paul Schroeder s meticulous historical scholarship persuasively shows the evolution of international 
society cannot be reduced to realist expectations about the balance of power The human search for security 
simply cannot be reconstructed on realist assumptions as individuals groups states and communities 
including the international society today have pursued more complex strategies and have fashioned more varied 
social mechanisms to cope with their uncertainty and angst over security than the analytic and normative 
depiction of security conveyed by the survey States and people when faced by coercive threats balance as 
realists would expect, but they also bandwagon hide and strive as Hobbes the Federalist and Axelrod suggest 
for cooperative solutions to political conflict war and security Curiously enough even if one were to adopt 
the essay s short time horizon for systematic historical analysis there would sull apparently be no place for 
informed journalism (Halberstram 1973 Sheehan 1988 and Talbott 1985)
No less disconcerting is the amazing ethnocentnsm of the survey alluded to earlier m its omission of 
European and Third World theorists and in its survey of the Cold War literature Security studies become 
American security studies It would require an article at least as long as the survey to explore just some of the 
important thinking and works of foreign scholars and pracuuoners who are disregarded (and denigrated) by their 
absence Anyone concerned with comparaUve security studies or with regional conflict—and with the end of the 
Cold War the latter are what we will have m abundance—dismisses the thinking and behavior of non Americans 
only at the peni of his scholarly credentials and policy relevance Trees fall even if Amencan secunty analysts 
are deaf to the event
Agenda for the Future Guidelines
This cursory cntique brings us finally to the essay s agenda for the future Rather than list additional lmes of 
analysis ad nauseam a more fruitful approach might be to identify several guidelines to facilitate the cooperative 
construction of a research and teaching agenda for the field Fust the secunty analyst as scholar should neither 
delegate the decision about what is real relevant and controllable nor claim a monopoly over this 
question Neither should he expect nor stnve for comfortable relations with policymakers nor conversely 
should he stram to pick fights to gratify professional or personal conceits The proper aims should be the 
promotion of mutual respect and understanding in the discharge of their vanous and sometimes competing 
responsibilities and roles The cultivation of a shared sense of self limitation would also help the secunty 
enterpnse and discourage the personalization of policy issues A wide and wide ranging net should be constantly 
cast to test reality Secunty and secunty studies are too important to be left entirely either to scholars or to 
policymakers—or to both—or to any one survey of the field.
Second the behavioral and normative assumptions on which research is conducted should be explicitly 
stated to associate a work with others of a similar kind in the interests of scientific and normative discovery as
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well as to expose hidden deeply embedded valuational biases that might distort or corrupt the objectivity of this 
creative effort On this score the essay s unabashed championing of realism deserves praise for rare candor 
though security studies are likely to be advanced more by multidisciplinary cooperation than by philosophical 
declamations
Third broaden the disciplinary and interdisciplinary scope of what we mean by security studies rather than 
nsk the field being captured by a clique of like minded cronies as Professor Walt sensibly warns (p 231) 
Neither scientific inquiry nor human self knowledge is promoted by blind commitment to a singular 
philosophical view or to group think-canon^that substitute assertion for reflection and discerning judgement in 
deciding what security is what security problems are and how they should be studied and resolved
Fourth broaden the historical and empirical basis for generalization to include not only the Western 
experience but also that of other cultures Above all do not confine the search for ¿/¿confirming evidence—the 
proper scientific test—to a selected number of case studies occurring within a limited urne frame and confined 
almost exclusively to a Western much less to an American frame of reference of purported policy relevance 
Area study scholars have much to offer on this score especially in the context of regional security studies In a 
fundamental analytic and philosophical sense anarchy may mdeed underlie the human condition but that 
insight does not get one very far unless the special circumstances and particular historical evolution of regional 
security systems are closely examined to identify how they work Anarchy and order are not the same thing nor 
necessarily counterpoised What is important to recognize as Hedley Bull and Barry Buzan suggest, is that 
anarchy may be ordered in many ways What forms they assume as security systems may perhaps be neither 
obvious nor logical but still be coherent and compelling in driving behavior (Bull 1977 Buzan 1991)
Fifth let the limits of the problem to be solved determine the scope and parameters of empirical and 
normative theory rather than impose a particular theory of politics and security that defines what has to be 
described explained and rationalized The latter approach is tantamount to looking for house keys under a street 
lamp because the light is better there rather than in the dark of where they were lost Incorporating first, second 
and third image analysis into theory building helps but these linear planes of analysis should not be confused 
with the multi dimensional geometric problem of integrating the sphere of politics with that of security We 
simplify to progress—especially in scientific analysis which demands that we ask questions in ways that can be 
tested by disconfirming evidence and data. In meeting these stringent requirements we are provided with 
powerful illumination to find our way Nevertheless the limitations of our tools especially in discriminating 
between competing value claims need also to be recognized
While international relations theorists are acutely aware of the new forces that now bind the world s 
populations many security theorists and policymakers still flinch from explonng the implications of these 
revolutionary conditions for the survival of the human species These include the ability to project nuclear 
weapons anywhere on the globe and the exposure of all particularistic politics—national communal and 
ideological—to almost instantaneous scrutiny and therefore to doubt and challenge thanks to global 
communications and transportation In the extreme the emergence of a truly global politics overlaying the 
legacy of diffuse and decentralized centers of decision that command formidable arrays of organized violence to 
get their way when their assertions of authority and legitimacy no longer command allegiance urges the 
perspective of a truly universal and integrated notion of security
To suggest so broad a scope for the problem does not unply that we know what the beast is or what its 
dimensions are Critical to the task of the security scholar and practitioner is the challenge of defining those 
dimensions as inclusively as possible Posing the issue this way does not immediately make us Kan trans or 
Grotrans or advocates of collective security and world government. Our knowledge of the complex ways m 
which the biological and historical evolutionary processes proceed is insufficient to admit to easy simplification 
What is clear however is that the security problem is greater than the sum of the parts of first second and 
third unage analysis It potentially encompasses for the first time in history all humans inhabiting the earth 
It should not be hard for security analysts to follow Clausewitz a little further and posit the notions of pure and 
real security as helpmates to the concepts of pure and real war As a practical matter and as the Iraq Kuwait 
cnsis (not to mention two world wars and the Cold War) suggestst the security problematic is truly global and
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inescapable Correspondingly real security regimes—say for Europe or the Middle East—are fundamentally 
provisional approximations of defining and solving this problem
Finally and following from the preceding guidelines resist the temptation of consigning security studies to 
a ghetto within the academy Since pre histone time as man emerged from the slime of the sea getting one s 
way and using violence to achieve it have been coterminous and causally contingent over human expenence 
We need all the tools as well as the scientific and interpretive knowledge we can muster to understand and master 
the ever powerful instruments of violence at our disposal if we are to persist prosper and progress as a species 
While there can be no doubt that we have security-problems it is presumptuous to allege that we have a theory 
of security Rather we have a problem The survey s blurred vision merges the study of security with its 
political pursuit it confounds the question of security with provisional answers for its realization which 
crystallize as the structures and assertions of power that we daily observe On these scores Wright is right 
when he appeals to the market place of ideas to explain war and what s real rather than rely primarily on 
policymakers ft»* answers
Paradoxically enough the renaissance in security studies acclaimed in the survey would not have been 
possible without generous foundation support, which broadened and deepened the interdisciplinary base of the 
field at many colleges and universities in the United States and abroad It was now quite proper and indeed 
urgent to study war violence and threats with the same dispassionate care and ngor as molecular biology and 
child development The future of that success would be rendered problematic if we relied on the essay s tenuous 
and tendentious rationalization for the incorporation of security studies within or outside the academy Security 
studies can thrive only if they are integrated into the professional concerns and canons of as inclusive a spectrum 
of disciplinary units as possible within the academy If we approach security problems m this catholic and 
questioning spint, we can do better and more—and have—than this useful but partial survey of secunty studies 
admits
10 Critique o f Renaissance o f Security Studies
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